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Abstract 5 
This paper argues that the origins of language can be detected one million years ago, if not 6 
earlier, in the archaeological record of Homo erectus.  This controversial claim is based on a 7 
broad theoretical and evidential foundation with language defined as communication based on 8 
symbols rather than grammar.   Peirce’s theory of signs (semiotics) underpins our analysis with 9 
its progression of signs (icon, index and symbol) used to identify artefact forms operating at the 10 
level of symbols. We draw on generalisations about the multiple social roles of technology in 11 
pre-industrial societies and on the contexts tool-use among non-human primates to argue for a 12 
deep evolutionary foundation for hominin symbol use. We conclude that symbol based language 13 
is expressed materially in arbitrary social conventions that permeate the technologies of Homo 14 
erectus and its descendants, and in the extended planning involved in the caching of tools and in 15 
the early settlement of island Southeast Asia.   16 
 17 
Introduction 18 
Language is biocultural behaviour (Darwin 1871; Sapir 1927; White 1940; Deacon 1997; 19 
Tomasello 2005; Christiansen et al. 2009; Fitch 2010; Arbib 2018), thus research into its origins 20 
is necessarily an interdisciplinary exercise. Models of language origins typically integrate social, 21 
cognitive, anatomical and genetic data as well as broad comparative perspectives drawn from 22 
ethology (Tallerman and Gibson 2012).  Archaeology provides the critical time depth for model 23 
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building.  Although there is broad agreement that symbols are crucial to language, there is 24 
profound disagreement on what constitutes language, when it evolved and on the interpretation 25 
of the material evidence (e.g., Noble and Davidson 1996; Deacon 1997; Corballis 2002; Hauser 26 
et al. 2002; Everett 2017; Fitch 2017; Böe et al. 2019).   27 
 28 
We take an uniformitarian approach which assumes language evolved by natural selection from a 29 
primate heritage of vocal and gestural communication.  Our theoretical foundation combines 30 
Peirce’s semiotics (1977), which distinguishes between index, icon and symbol, with 31 
ethnolinguistic data which challenge preconceptions about the inherent grammatical complexity 32 
of language (Everett 2005; Jackendoff and Wittenberg 2014).
1
  Both sources enable us to 33 
broaden the search for the beginnings of language beyond the current consensus among 34 
archaeologists on what constitutes evidence of symbol use (e.g., Klein 2017). Comparative 35 
ethnographic and anatomical evidence also shows that language, defined here as communication 36 
based on symbols, does not depend on either a broad vocal repertoire or a fully modern vocal 37 
tract (Boë et al. 2017; Fitch 2018). We use these data to offer a model for a simple grammatical 38 
structure in the earliest language, with recursive grammar a later and non-essential component of 39 
language.   40 
 41 
Sociological, ethnographic and ethological observations provide evidence of a central role for 42 
tools in the construction of society (Killick 1992; Latour 1992; Hodder 1994, 2013; Gosden and 43 
Marshall 1999; Ingold 2000; Skibo and Schiffer 2008).  Contemporary societies have names for 44 
                                                        
1 A brief definition of Peircean signs, to be elaborated as our discussion progresses, is: icon 
– physical similarity (in shape, image, size, colour, etc.); index – physical connection or 
relation in terms of time, space, or causality; symbol – conventional link between the 
object, interpretant, and form of the sign. 
3 
 
tools, conventions for their making, and they carry expressive meaning beyond their utilitarian 45 
ends (Arthur 2018).  In Peirce’s semiotic scheme, names are symbols, and by implication the 46 
earliest evidence of symbols lies in conventional tool forms and the strategies for making them.  47 
Our summary in this paper of Peirce’s scheme has a secondary aim which is to reintroduce the 48 
study of signs to evolutionary cognitive archaeology as a complement to current models drawn 49 
from cognitive science (Wynn 2017).  We do not set out to offer an entirely new theory of the 50 
origin of language, but rather a new perspective on the evidence base that supports the thesis that 51 
Homo erectus had language. 52 
 53 
We begin with a brief review of the philosophical and historical context of the current debate 54 
over language origins, highlighting the contrast between punctuated and gradualist models.  The 55 
hypothesis of a recent and rapid appearance of language, as defined by symbols organised in 56 
complex nested grammatical structures (recursion), continues to dominate interpretations of the 57 
archaeological record (e.g., Bolhuis et al. 2014; Klein 2008, 2017). This non-Darwinian 58 
perspective on language origins is founded on the work of the linguist Chomsky (1965).  59 
Proponents of gradualist hypotheses tend to posit a protolanguage phase which precedes the 60 
emergence of recursion-based language (e.g., Donald 1991; Corballis 2002; Bickerton 2014).  61 
We highlight previous applications of Peirce’s theory of signs to the issue of language evolution 62 
(Deacon 1997, 2010; Cousins 2014; Everett 2017). Our approach differs in accepting symbol-use 63 
with a simple grammar as sufficient evidence for the existence of language with no need for a 64 
protolanguage.  A three-part evolutionary typology of grammars lies at the foundation of  65 
Everett’s model (2017), in which symbols  arose as a distinctive form of communication based 66 




We then outline a theoretical foundation that defines symbols and considers the social contexts 69 
of symbol use in relation to technology. First is Peirce’s theory of signs and his concept of a 70 
semiotic progression from icon, to index to symbol (Peirce 1998). Second, we draw 71 
generalisations about tools as symbols from observations by sociologists and anthropologists of 72 
contemporary and pre-industrial societies.  These observations highlight the social construction 73 
of the meaning of tools and how decisions about production methods reflect social conventions 74 
(e.g. Latour 1992; Killick 2001).  This section concludes with an assessment of the non-human 75 
primate capacity to generate perceptual and conceptual categories of objects (Grüber et al. 2015) 76 
as evidence a deep evolutionary foundation for constructing symbols.  Modern humans are 77 
distinctive among animals for using tools as symbols. 78 
 79 
We then examine the early archaeological record for evidence of socially constructed 80 
conventions (symbols) with a focus on the Acheulean of Africa and Eurasia from about one 81 
million years ago onwards when conventional tool forms become a recurrent feature of the 82 
archaeological record.  The evidence takes the form of regional and chronological changes in 83 
approaches to making large bifaces (cleavers, handaxes), and in the life history of these 84 
technologies which demonstrate spatially extended chaîne opératoires including the caching of 85 
tools in the landscape (Preysler et al. 2018).  Multiple ways of achieving similar ends 86 
(equifinality) becomes evident in core preparation strategies at this time (Sharon 2009; Gallotti 87 
& Mussi 2017) which we interpret as evidence of culturally governed choices among viable 88 
alternatives (Latour 1992; Killick 2001).  Semantic scaffolds (words or gestures as labels) would 89 
have eased the cognitive demands created by some core strategies which involved nested 90 
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hierarchies of steps in blank production (Herzlinger et al. 2017). Language (speech and gesture 91 
based) would also have facilitated the teaching of such complex routine to novices (Morgan et al. 92 
2015; Gärdenfors and Högberg 2017:201).  Evidence in the Acheulean for the caching of 93 
handaxes is indicative of extended future planning, and arguably for abstract thought which is 94 
the foundation of symbol construction (Gärdenfors 2004). Language without complex grammar 95 
was sufficient for the transmission of all these aspects of Acheulean technological behaviours  96 
 97 
Additional support exists for an early emergence of language in the settlement of island southeast 98 
Asia by hominins ~800,000 years ago (Bednarik 1997, 2014; van den Bergh et al. 2016; Ingicco 99 
et al. 2018). Early sea-crossings arguably involved levels of coordinated planning and action that 100 
exceed the communicative capacity of gestures alone. 101 
 102 
The structure of our argument, building on Peirce, addresses five questions raised by Ingold 103 
(1993:337) and others since (Noble and Davidson 1996; Corbey et al. 2016; Tennie et al. 2016; 104 
Shea 2017) on the utility of handaxes as evidence for early language: 1) can the longevity of the 105 
handaxe (and cleaver) as forms be evidence of cultural norms given there is no modern analogue 106 
for such persistence; 2) does such persistence necessitate cultural transmission; 3) did the objects 107 
conform to a representation in the mind of the maker; 4) do they tell us anything about hominin 108 
sociality; and 5) might they have had “communicative or semiotic as well as technical 109 
functions?”  We return to these questions in the discussion and conclude with the implications of 110 
attributing language to Homo erectus and erectus-like species. 111 
 112 
From Plato to Chomsky: Epistemologies of language origins 113 
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A fundamental division characterizes current research on how and when language began.  The 114 
split lies along deep philosophical fault lines that separate Platonists - who believe in universal or 115 
innate ideas shared by all humans (Defez 2013) - and the Aristotelian view of language as an 116 
inherently cultural phenomenon, learned in social contexts from a young age (Corballis 2002; 117 
Tomasello 2005, 2014; Everett 2016, 247ff ) and based on neurobiological capacities for 118 
acquiring language (see Tallerman and Gibson 2012 for summary of debate on language specific 119 
vs. generalised biological structures for language learning).   120 
 121 





 centuries.  Plato’s perspective of language as an innately human faculty was transformed 123 
into a theological position of human exceptionalism explained by the divine origin of reason 124 
(Müller 1864). The Société Linguistique de Paris, in 1866, famously decreed that it would no 125 
longer discuss the issue at its meetings as it was an insoluble metaphysical problem (Defez 126 
2013).  Darwin (1871) took a more broadly comparative approach to the problem of language 127 
origins, finding continuity between human and non-human forms of communication.  Natural 128 
and sexual selection supplanted, in his view, essentialism as mechanisms for understanding how 129 
language evolved. Darwin's gradualist view of language origins follows from his view of 130 
evolution as an accumulative process that can produce complexity. New traits emerge from 131 
existing traits and abilities related to human language will be found in other species, and 132 
particularly among primates.  133 
Platonism returned in force in the mid-20
th
 century with the work of Chomsky (e.g., 1957, 1965, 134 
1976, 1995). In his Transformational-Generative Grammar (or Minimalism), language is a 135 
grammatical system above all else. Chomsky's embrace of Cartesian dualism leads him to reject 136 
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Darwin's idea that we might find the precursors of human language in other species (Berwick 137 
and Chomsky 2016). Indeed Chomsky and his followers have argued explicitly against 138 
Darwinism (e.g., Piatelli-Palmarini 2010), in favour of the position of Alfred Wallace that 139 





In the late 20
th
 century, the case for language as product of gradual natural selection was 143 
articulated by Pinker and Bloom (1990).  More recently, the evolution of language has been 144 
framed in the context of more holistic approaches to cultural evolution which recognise the 145 
importance of social learning in the acquisition of language (Richerson and Boyd 2005; 146 
Tomasello 2005), and in the gradual development of linguistic structures (e.g., Christiansen and 147 
Kirby 2003; Steels 2012; Hurford 2004, 2014).   148 
   149 
Models of language origins and the interpretation of the archaeological record 150 
Given Chomsky's enormous influence in linguistics and related disciplines, a philosophical 151 
divide continues between supporters of a recent punctuated origin of language and those who 152 
maintain a gradualist evolutionary position (summarised in Tallerman and Gibson 2012; 153 
Haspelmath 2020).  The material evidence used by both camps incorporates both the 154 
archaeological and fossil record, with inferences drawn about the need for language (symbols) in 155 
relation to the hierarchical complexity of a task (Wynn 2002), and from the fossil record in 156 
relation to the capacity to produce speech as a component of language (e.g., Lieberman 2007). 157 
We start with the essentialist position of Chomsky and illustrate its lasting impact on 158 
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 In Wallace (1870] Wallace argues that natural selection cannot account for the "mental faculties of man."  
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archaeological theory and method. The gradualist position lacks a figurehead and instead 159 
manifests itself in a variety of accretionary hypotheses including our semiotics-based position 160 
presented here.   161 
 162 
A punctuated origin 163 
 The most enduring model developed since the 1950s is that of Chomsky, in which human 164 
language is distinguished from other forms of communication by the presence of hierarchical 165 
recursive grammar generated by a computational system in the brain, independently of cultural 166 
context (Chomsky 1965; Hauser et al. 2002).  Recursion involves embedding sub-phrases into 167 
phrases of similar type, and in theory enabling an unlimited range of sentences (and meanings) to 168 
be constructed from a limited range of sounds.  According to this innatist view, all modern 169 
humans are born with this uniquely human faculty for producing language with recursion 170 
(universal grammar) which arose suddenly in Homo sapiens from a genetic mutation in the brain 171 
sometime between 70,000 to 50,000 years ago (Bolhuis et al. 2014). The most relevant 172 
archaeological evidence for language takes the form of proxies for symbol use because 173 
“language is interdependent with symbolic thought” (Bolhuis et al. 2014:3).  Botha (2010:202) 174 
adds the requirement of a bridging theory between claimed evidence for symbol use and fully 175 
syntactical language (or recursion).  Such a theory should incorporate testable hypotheses, such 176 
as those drawn from neuroscience, marshal factual evidence and not be ad hoc.  At the core of 177 
this approach is a computational model of the mind in which the language mutation represents a 178 




The proposition that recursion is the essence of language has never been fully accepted by all 181 
linguists (see Tallerman and Gibson 2012), but it entered the mainstream of archaeological 182 
interpretation in the 1970s in a regional analysis of the Middle to Upper Palaeolithic transition in 183 
southwestern France (Mellars 1973).  Stark contrasts were drawn between the two behavioural 184 
records produced by two different species, Neanderthals and Homo sapiens respectively. These 185 
became the unintended foundation of the concept of a more general ‘Human Revolution’ 186 
(Mellars1989, 2005) in which symbol use and complex (recursive) language marked the 187 
emergence of behavioural modernity (Henshilwood and Marean 2003).   188 
 189 
The human faculty for producing recursive grammar, or its equivalent ‘fully syntactical 190 
language’, features consistently as the key advantage that Homo sapiens possessed over other 191 
hominins, especially in relation to Neanderthals.  The Middle to Upper Palaeolithic transition 192 
reflects this underlying difference in communicative superiority, with anatomically modern 193 
humans able to produce a range of behaviours far beyond the capacity of Neanderthals (Mellars 194 
1973, 1989, 2005).  Complex language enabled the development of new kinds of standardised 195 
stone tools (blades), organic artefacts, long-distance transport of materials, new subsistence 196 
behaviours and objects bearing symbolic value as well as the capacity to innovate quickly. 197 
Symbolic value was recognised to reside in abstractions such as cave and portable art as well as 198 
personal jewellery and the act of burial with grave goods.  199 
 200 
The relatively abrupt transition from the Middle to Upper Palaeolithic marked a symbolic 201 
explosion which “must reflect the existence of relatively complicated and highly structured 202 
forms of language” associated with H. sapiens (Mellars 1989:359).  Similar interpretations were 203 
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made of this transition in the 1980s and 1990s (Chase and Dibble 1987; Davidson and Noble 204 
1989; Byers 1994) with the more recent addition of demographic superiority as a consequence of 205 
the human capacity for innovation founded on fully syntactic language (Mellars and French 206 
2011). 207 
 208 
Elements of the ‘Revolution’ have since been found in the African Middle Stone Age (from 209 
300,000 years ago with regionally variable end dates) associated with Homo sapiens, supporting 210 
arguments for an earlier development of symbol use in Africa than in Europe (McBrearty and 211 
Brooks 2000; Henshilwood and Marean 2003; Barham and Mitchell 2008; Wadley 2015). This 212 
evidence has been incorporated into the essentialist paradigm as evidence of the language 213 
mutation occurring as early as 70,000 years ago with Homo sapiens in Africa (Bolhuis et al. 214 
2014), or even later once there is consistent rather than episodic evidence of symbolic behaviours 215 
in the African record (Klein 2008, 2017; see Fisher 2017 for critique of the genetic evidence).   216 
 217 
The latter interpretation takes an absolutist position that Dawkins, in a blogpost (2011), calls the 218 
“tyranny of the discontinuous mind” which is “blind to intermediaries”.  Clear discontinuities 219 
should exist, in this extreme view, between the modern human capacity for recursion-based 220 
language and the more limited linguistic capacities of other hominins (Zilhao 2019).  Recent 221 
discoveries of evidence for the capacity of Neanderthals to create a range of symbolic objects 222 
appears to give this hominin membership in the once exclusive club of symbol makers (e.g., 223 
d’Errico and Stringer 2011; Finlayson et al. 2012; Aubert et al. 2014; Villa and Roebroeks 2014; 224 
Jaubert et al. 2016; Hoffman et al. 2018). There have been challenges to the claims of 225 
Neanderthal authorship of rock art based on issues of contamination with the dating, and 226 
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similarly with the early dates attributed to some personal ornaments (White et al. 2019; Pons-227 
Branchu et al. 2020).  228 
 229 
An extended assessment of the evidence for Neanderthal symbol-use and language concludes 230 
that to organise the hunting of large game they had to refer to abstractions of space and time in 231 
the planning (i.e., not here, not now).  To do so required the capacity to construct “arbitrary 232 
Saussurean linguistic signs” Botha (2020:155) which in Peirce’s semiotics (below) would be 233 
symbols. He concludes that they lacked the necessary brain structures to produce complex 234 
grammar (recursion), but may have had the capacity to string together simple sentences.  In the 235 
gradualist model developed in this paper, the capacity to create symbols is sufficient for 236 
language with no need for complex grammar to communicate complex thought.  If we attribute 237 
this capacity to Neanderthals then parsimony points to an earlier origin of language with the 238 
common ancestor of H. sapiens and Neanderthals (Deacon and Wurz 2001), now thought to have 239 
existed at least 600,000 years ago (Martinón-Torres 2018; Welker et al. 2020), or to convergence 240 
through separate, independent evolution.  The first position opens the door to the roots of 241 
language with Homo erectus or its descendants, and the second suggests the foundations for 242 
symbol making were widespread among other hominins, with the possibility that language 243 
evolved independently more than once.   244 
 245 
A gradual evolution of language 246 
Gradualist models have a long pedigree (Darwin 1871), but placed in the time frame of 247 
Chomsky’s influence, a variety of approaches have emerged that vary in emphasis on the 248 
biological or cultural factors influencing the origin of language, and in their interpretation of the 249 
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archaeological record (e.g., Donald 1991; Dunbar 1996; Noble and Davidson 1996; Mithen 250 
1996; Power 1999; Corballis 2002; Bickerton 2009, 2014; Coolidge and Wynn 2009; Rossano 251 
2010; Lombard & Gärdenfors 2017).   Deacon (1989; 2010), Cousins (2014) and Everett (2017) 252 
stand apart from other gradualists in using Peirce's theory of signs.  None is an archaeologist, 253 
which is noteworthy given the rarity of engagement with Peirce by Palaeolithic archaeologists 254 
(Iliopoulos 2016; Wynn 2017; Ruck and Uomini in press).   This reluctance by archaeologists to 255 
apply semiotics to the deep past may reflect unfamiliarity with Peirce’s work, or resistance to it 256 
because of its association in recent decades with structuralism and the post-structuralist critique 257 
of positivist science (Preucel 2006).  In this context, the work of evolutionary biologist Deacon 258 
(1997) marks a key development in using Peirce’s triad of signs (icon, index and symbols) as a 259 
framework for the evolution of human consciousness.  He argues that only humans represent or 260 
give meaning to experience through arbitrary symbols (language), and that Homo erectus had the 261 
capacity to form language-based societies, but lacked the anatomical ability to produce articulate 262 
speech, citing Lieberman’s reconstruction of the anatomical constraints of the pre-sapiens larynx 263 
(1984). These societies communicated using a mix of limited sounds that carried symbolic 264 
meaning coupled with gesture, and over time a linguistic niche evolved (though cf. Everett 2016, 265 
170ff for a critique of "niche construction theory"). The coevolution of an extended childhood 266 
and articulate language followed a Baldwinian trajectory which favours the selection for traits 267 
which facilitate social learning (Deacon 2010).     268 
Deacon’s characterisation of the limited capacity for articulate speech with H. erectus plays a 269 
critical role in his gradualist model of a developing language niche. That status of the vocal tract 270 
as critical to articulate speech production has since been challenged (see de Boer 2017; Fitch 271 
2018; Böe 2019 for syntheses of human and non-human primate evidence; and Dediu et al. 2017 272 
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for variability of the vocal tract in modern human populations). The fossil evidence now 273 
indicates that modern-like speech and auditory capacities had evolved by at least 430,000 years 274 
ago in the ancestor of Neanderthals and Denisovans (Martínez et al. 2004; Gómez-Olivencia et 275 
al. 2007; Martínez et al. 2008; Dediu and Levinson 2013; Steele et al. 2013).  The neurological 276 
control of breathing to produce articulate speech may have evolved as early as 1.8 Ma with 277 
Homo erectus, but was not present in australopithecines (Meyer 2016; Meyer and Haeusler 2015; 278 
cf. MacLarnon and Hewitt 2004). 279 
Comparative linguistic data provides additional support for the observation that only a few 280 
sounds are needed to produce language (Newbrand 1951; Firchow and Firchow 1969; Everett 281 
1979), and the majority of the world’s languages (60%-70%) employ tones to distinguish words 282 
(Yip 2002) along with other prosodic features that rely on laryngeal features that do not 283 
implicate the vocal apparatus directly (Everett 2012).   Homo erectus, and other hominins, could 284 
have used tones to supplement a small phonemic inventory to clarify, as all tone languages do, 285 
words that might otherwise sound alike.   286 
Cousins (2014:163), a cultural psychologist, uses Peirce’s framework to argue for a ‘semiotic 287 
coevolution’ of the capacity for meaning-making with supportive cognitive, social and vocal 288 
structures.  Agreed meaning is only adaptive in the context of “culturally grounded knowledge 289 
about the world – conventions, narrative, beliefs” (Cousins 2014:164).  In this model, cultural 290 
knowledge emerged from tool-making, starting with the Oldowan, as a physical nexus for 291 
cooperation between individuals.  Tool-making, language and social learning co-evolved, 292 
creating a distinctive cultural niche.  As with Deacon, Cousins (2014:164) posits an initial 293 
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protolanguage based on a few words (symbols) which gradually evolves through Baldwinian 294 
selection into more a grammatically complex language.  295 
 296 
Everett (2016, 2017) applies his perspective as an ethnolinguist, with long experience working 297 
among South American hunter-gatherers and horticulturalists, to developing a model of language 298 
evolution that draws directly on Peirce’s theory of signs.  Underlying Everett’s approach is a 299 
three-stage typology of grammatical complexity that recognises the variability observed among 300 
contemporary languages, including those lacking recursion, as found in some small-scale 301 
societies (Jackendoff 1999; Everett 2005; Gil 2009; Jackendoff and Wittenburg 2014).  A meta-302 
analysis of the morphological and syntactical structures of >2,000 languages has shown a 303 
significant correlation between group size and language structure (Lupyan and Dale 2010).  304 
Speakers of languages in small societies use fewer words, but more inflection to express 305 
meaning than speakers of languages in large groups who typically rely on increased word content 306 
and grammatical complexity to convey meaning.   307 
  308 
In Everett’s typology the most basic grammar, referred to as G1, has a linear word order (subject-309 
verb-object) that conveys meaning (figure 1).  G2 languages have hierarchical structures but no 310 
recursion (figure 2), and G3 languages have recursion (figure 3) (Everett 2017: Chapter 9). In this 311 
hierarchy of grammars there is no need for a protolanguage in language evolution; a G1 language 312 
is sufficient to convey nuanced, abstract meaning. G1 languages evolved first, with recursion a 313 
late and unnecessary expectation for early languages (Karlsson 2009; Everett 2012). G1 – G3 314 
coexist today with G1 and G2 languages found in societies without written languages (Everett 315 
2005; Gil 2009). 316 
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The empirical differences in these three grammars are illustrated diagrammatically using 317 
sentences 1-3, in Figures 1a-c: 318 
1 John came in the room. John sat. John slept. 319 
2 John entered the room by the garden. John slept.  320 
3 John came in the room, sat, and slept.  321 
The figures in 1a-c conform to a G1 grammar: 322 
 323 
 324 
  325 
In these diagrams there are no category labels, e.g., "noun" or "verb," and no phrase labels, such 326 
as "Verb Phrase." The simplest grammatical structure would be a linear arrangement of words as 327 
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a proposition/sentence.  There are modern languages represented by G1 grammars, for example 328 
Pirahã (see also Futrell, et. al. 2016; Everett and Gibson 2019) but also Warlpiri, Wargamay, 329 
Hixkaryána, Kayardild, Gavião, and Amele among others (Pullum 2020). 330 
A G2 grammar would allow the structure in Figure 2 which shows hierarchical nesting of sub-331 
phrases:  332 









   340 
Two sentences are contained in or "dominated by" the highest sentence making this a grammar 341 
without constraints on recursion. 342 
 343 
Everett (2017) uses Peirce’s theory of signs (below) to outline an evolutionary pathway to 344 
symbol-based language based on speech and gestures. The archaeological record of Homo 345 
erectus provides the material evidence for concluding that this hominin used symbols and at least 346 
a G1 level of language to transmit complex cultural knowledge (Everett 2016).  We develop that 347 





Defining and Recognising Symbols; Peirce’s Semiotics 351 
Between the late 1800s and his death in 1914, Peirce developed one of the most comprehensive 352 
philosophical programs since Aristotle. Semiotics, the theory of signs, was Peirce's focus and 353 
touchstone (Peirce 1992, 1998). His symbolic system was neither the result of nature, nor 354 
nurture, but was constrained by logic (as it in turn constrained logic), a theory opposed to 355 
Cartesian dualism, introspection, and intuition, all of which Peirce considered deeply 356 
unscientific. Perhaps because of the popularity of the simpler, dyadic semiotic system of 357 
Saussure (1916 [1983]), those unfamiliar with the triadic Peircean system might be excused for 358 
confusing signs and symbols.  Whereas Saussure postulated only a dyadic sign-form-meaning 359 
composite, Peirce postulates a triadic theory of signs.   360 
Peirce contended that all living systems communicate with their surroundings by responding to 361 
visual, acoustic and chemical cues (signs); a founding principle of biosemiotics and zoosemiotics 362 
(see Delahaye 2019 for an overview of these fields).  In this framework, signs communicate an 363 
object to an interpreter and the response by interpreter is called the interpretant (Peirce 1998). 364 
Most signs (indexes and icons, below) do not require conventions to understand and respond to 365 
the cues, but humans in particular generate meaning from signs based on socially learned 366 
conventions (symbols).   367 
The ability to use symbols exists among non-human primates as in the case of the bonobo, 368 
Kanzi, who was taught by humans to communicate using visual symbols (Gibson 2002; Savage-369 
Rumbaugh et al. 2004).  Vocal symbols also exist among some primates, as in the case of vervet 370 
monkeys which learn over time how to respond to the group’s alarm calls linked to specific 371 
external threats (Ribiero et al. 2006).  Vervet symbol use, however, differs from the human 372 
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faculty for using symbols to generate a potentially infinite number of new combinations and 373 
meanings (Piantadosi and Fedorenko 2017).  374 
Peirce's theory of signs encompasses a wide empirical range, and we discuss only five key 375 
components needed for understanding our claim that H. erectus possessed a symbolic system and 376 
language: icon, index, symbol, object and interpretant.  377 
Icons resemble their referents (objects). They are not merely reflections, photos, or drawings and 378 
can be anything which resembles "in some way." For example, ground moisture level can be a 379 
cue or icon, "telling" an earthworm to surface. When an earthworm "decides" the amount of 380 
water passes its threshold, the amount of water is an icon of maximum tolerable exposure. A 381 
human face's reflection in the water is an icon of the face (and other faces generally). In 382 
grammar, examples of iconicity can be seen in the fact that prepositions with more content 383 
("before," "towards") tend to be longer than prepositions with less content ("to," "in"). 384 
2. Indexes signal a spatial, temporal or other physical relationship with the object. A mouse 385 
rustling in grass is an acoustic index-sign to a cat. Humans also use indexes (smells, footprints, 386 
sounds) and images, and natural tolerances, such as temperature, taste and texture, but use more 387 
complex versions of these signs. Indexes may be pronouns like "here," "there," or simply 388 
pointing to something where the line from the pointing appendage to the object is an imaginary 389 
connection. 390 
3. A symbol is in general any sign by which the form signals its meaning by a conventional 391 
cultural interpretation, linking object, interpretant, and the sign. The symbol ‘dog’ means Canis 392 
familiaris in English because the culture from which ‘dog’ emerged valued this concept and 393 
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agreed (by practice) to link the phonetic form, i.e. oral sign, [dɔg] with the object, a specific dog 394 
or the class of dogs, via a culturally-agreed interpretation.    395 
Indexes and icons in language function only because their forms and relations are conventional, 396 
that is they are simultaneously symbolic and indexical, symbols-as-icons and symbols-as-397 
indexes. This multiplicity of meaning also applies to material objects, such as a steel butter knife 398 
which operates simultaneously as an icon of the category of knife, an index of the metal, its 399 
properties and intended function/spreading movement, and as a symbol of the process of 400 
preparing food or the habitual time of use, such as breakfast. These multiple functions co-exist in 401 
the object, and as habituated users we are unaware of these learned associations and the range of 402 
interpretations they represent.  Humans and animals overlap in using indexes and icons and 403 
needing to interpret them, they differ in that humans use and create symbols habitually, and no 404 
known non-human systems require or manifest culturally productive symbols (Hurford 2004; 405 
Piantadosi and Fedorenko 2017).Yet no human language lacks symbols (Everett 2016), and we 406 
have the socio-cognitive foundations for creating  symbols (Callaghan 2020). 407 
Once symbols have arisen through convention, (e.g., recognizing a tool as more than an icon and 408 
an index, but also a symbol of craftsmanship, cultural purpose, and personal identity), how does 409 
this new set of conventional signs acquire a grammar? Bates and Goodman (1999), Goldberg 410 
(2019), and Fedorenko et al. (2012), inter alia, offer a valuable clue. Symbols (what these authors 411 
refer to as words and “constructions”) are claimed to be not only logically prior to grammar, as 412 
Peirce would claim, but also psychologically foundational for grammar (Bates and Goodman 413 
1999) and neurologically more significant than grammar per se (Fedorenko et al. 2012). The 414 
grammar of symbols becomes in this view, the “choice” of how to arrange the symbols of a 415 
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particular culture (Everett 2012, 2017).  This arrangement can be complicated as in many 416 
modern languages, but given the variation found in the world’s languages there is no one model 417 
of complexity required for the first languages contra Chomsky (1995). Everett’s G1 is the 418 
simplest option for communicating meaning, and logically the earliest in a gradualist model of 419 
language evolution. 420 
Chase (1991) considers stone tools as iconic objects created as a result of an understanding of the 421 
cause and effect relationship of the properties of stone in relation to the laws of physics.  But as 422 
Cousins (2014:179) observes, there is nothing inherent in the stone that leads to an awareness of 423 
the variables to be managed in order to strike a flake from a core with consistency.  The physical 424 
properties of the core, the hammer, and the control of the angle and force of blow are not 425 
inherent in the materials; they are interpretations made of the materials as part of a process of 426 
meaning-making.  This is a semiotic perspective which then raises issues of the context of 427 
learning – is it shared intentionally through teaching (e.g., Morgan et al. 2015; Lombao et al. 428 
2017) or learned individually by trial and error (Tennie et al. 2016)?   429 
Wynn (1993:402) acknowledges that certain elaborated tools, like handaxes, can be indexes of 430 
the hierarchical process of making the object and come to represent the maker.   If the object 431 
represents an activity and the maker, and does so through repetition rather than shared intention, 432 
then in Wynn’s perspective the handaxe is an index.  When shared intention is involved then the 433 
object becomes a symbol.  The question becomes how do archaeologists, as observers of the 434 
objects separated by deep time from the social contexts of makers and users, recognise shared 435 
intention in the Palaeolithic record?  The question is not new (see Holloway 1969), and we 436 
incorporate the two criteria, restated by Davidson (2002:181), of Noble and Davidson (1996) 437 
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into our analysis: “the manufacture of tools of preconceived form, produced outside the 438 
immediate context of use, must entail a representation of intention, something that we may 439 
consider indicative of language as communication using symbols.”  440 
The difficulty of distinguishing between icon and symbol in objects which are unfamiliar to us is 441 
one reason archaeologists have focused on representational images in cave art as markers of 442 
symbol use (e.g., Mellars 1973, 1989, 2005). These images show contemplation and attention to 443 
meaning, but in the absence of other contextual data, representational (depictive) art is not 444 
symbolic. It is only iconic, but non-representational images, such as the abundant dots and grids 445 
in Upper Palaeolithic cave art (Bahn and Vertut 1997), have potential symbolic content given 446 
they are arbitrary, repeated forms. 447 
Symbols can originate in many ways, exploiting the different senses, including visually, as with 448 
tools, and orally. Orally, symbols arise through sound symbolism, such as onomatopoetic words 449 
like "crash," "bang," "boom." We can also see sound symbolism in clusters of sounds in words 450 
with similar meanings, such as gleam, glow, glitter, and glisten. It can be seen in particular 451 
sounds that show intensity, such as tamp vs. tap, stomp vs step. Sound symbolism is common 452 
across the world's languages (Sapir 1915; Urban 1988; Everett 1979).  Each sign needs a 453 
physical form, and vocal sounds are the best solution to providing form for signs (Everett 2012).  454 
4. An interpretant is necessary for the arbitrary content of symbols to be meaningful to a viewer 455 
or listener.  A bridging component, the interpretant, can take the form of other signs and 456 
meaningful conventions: “In a world without interpretants a sickle and hammer would only mean 457 
a sickle crossed with a hammer.  And Leonardo’s Last Supper would only be a very gloomy 458 
dinner or a meeting of thirteen unshaven men” (Eco 1976:1467).  With material objects 459 
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interpretants may become part of the learned cultural knowledge, signalling aspects of the object 460 
that the viewer will recognize implicitly as meaningful. This meaning is ephemeral and context 461 
specific, as in the case of the butter knife.  It is not accessible by a viewer separated in time, 462 
space and culturally from this implicit knowledge, but as with icons we can infer that 463 
interpretants existed when we find repeated (conventional) artefact forms and selection among a 464 
range of strategies for making these objects.   465 
In summary, symbols are both necessary and sufficient conditions for language. Complex 466 
recursive grammar is not the point of origin for all human languages (contra Hauser et al. 2002; 467 
Berwick and Chomsky 2016), and grammatical structure alone is not sufficient for language; for 468 
any human syntax, each node in a syntactic tree must be labelled, (e.g., Noun Phrase, Verb 469 
Phrase; Murphy 2015:715). Labels are symbols in the Peircean sense – conventional, 470 
categorizing generalizations across different units of linguistic representation.  471 
Tools as Social Conventions and Symbols    472 
To support a claim that tools of the Lower Palaeolithic carried symbolic meaning this section 473 
draws generalizations from sociological, ethnographic, and ethological research about tool-474 
making as socially learned, conventionalised knowledge.  It starts with contexts of meaning 475 
generation and discusses the distinction between utilitarian and symbolic objects as a potential 476 
obstacle to an uniformitarian approach.  A comparative assessment follows of the social contexts 477 
of tool-use among non-human primates with a focus on chimpanzees as our closest genetic 478 
relatives.  Their cognitive capacity to discriminate between kinds of tools is relevant in the 479 




Tool use is widespread in the animal kingdom (Lefebvre et al 2002; Beck 2008; Aunger 2010, 482 
Bentley-Condit and Smith 2010; Shumaker et al 2011), but tool-making as the deliberate 483 
modification of an object is relatively rare among animals (Biro et al. 2013).  The creation and 484 
sharing of tools in the human context differs from that of other animals in that it combines the 485 
material with the ideational.  Human technologies materialise and sustain worldviews, identities, 486 
social relations and life-ways (Guidon 2015:79-80). Perhaps the most unusual aspect of tool use 487 
for humans is that tools become symbols, as well as functioning as indexes and icons 488 
(Pfaffenberger 2001).   489 
The symbolic aspect of technology is well theorized and empirically supported in sociological 490 
studies of technologies in contemporary and  historical contexts and in archaeological contexts 491 
with diverse and chronologically well-constrained data (e.g., Hodder 1982; Kopytoff 1986; Pinch 492 
and Bijker 1984; Latour 1992; Ingold 1993; Gosden 2005; Hodder 2012; Wallis 2013). The 493 
obvious limitation of this approach for archaeologists working with early to mid-Pleistocene 494 
material is that we do not have access to texts or verbal accounts that enrich sociological 495 
analyses.  Nor do we have the broader range of material culture found in some later Pleistocene 496 
contexts with which to distinguish indexes and icons as well as a range of tool-making 497 
conventions, and we must contend with a discontinuous and often poorly-dated record (Shea 498 
2017). We can, however, draw inferences about the past existence of meaning-making in a 499 
semiotic sense from the judicious use of human and non-human analogues, recognising their 500 
inherent limitations (e.g., Wobst 1978; McGrew 2010), combined with experimental archaeology 501 
with direct application to the archaeological record (Stout et al. 2019). The latter generates 502 
observations on the social and cognitive processes involved in interactions with objects 503 
(Gärdenfors and Högberg 2017).  Research in cognitive archaeology adds to the understanding of 504 
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tool-making and use as embodied biocultural behaviours integrating perception and action within 505 
wider physical and social environments (Leroi Gourhan 1993; Stout 2002, Stout et al. 2019; 506 
Malafouris 2013; Uomini and Meyer 2013; Fairlie and Barham 2016; Overmann and Wynn 507 
2019).   508 
 509 
Creating meaning with tools: inferences from social constructionism 510 
Social constructionists working cross-culturally among pre-industrial societies, and with an eye 511 
to the archaeological record, provide useful generalisations on symbol-use applicable to the past.  512 
Killick (2004:573-4) outlines three basic differences between pre-industrial and industrial 513 
societies in relation to the social transmission of technologies, and the ideational roles of tools 514 
and technologies.  The learning of technical skills takes place using a combination of language, 515 
gesture, imitation and guided intervention or teaching in what Csibra and Gergely (2011) call 516 
‘natural pedagogy’ (e.g., Draper 1976:210, learning leather-work among Ju/’hoansi children, 517 
Botswana).  Technology shapes the social persona and world view of the individual, as among 518 
Nuer pastoralists of the Sudan (Evans-Pritchard (1976:89 [1940]) for whom their limited 519 
material culture serves as “chains along which social relationships run, and the simpler is a 520 
material culture the more numerous are the relationships expressed through it.”  Theories of 521 
technology (ontologies) in pre-industrial societies are often linked to social processes and natural 522 
phenomena (Stout 2002).  Gamo horticultural communities (Ethiopia) are one of the few 523 
remaining makers of stone tools, and perceive their tool-stone as a named living and social being 524 




Among recent and historical hunter-gatherers, the cultural act of attributing symbolic value to 527 
raw materials is widespread:  (e.g., Gould et al. 1971, Australia; Tayanin and Lindell 2012, 528 
Southeast Asia; Brandišaukas 2016, Siberia; Guindon 2015, Canadian subarctic; and papers in 529 
Boivin 2004 for cultural perceptions of soils and minerals). Objects also carry meaning as 530 
arbitrary conventions linking the object to social personas. The sharing of object names with 531 
social persona and personal identity is seen with the woman’s kaross among the Ju’/hoansi (chi 532 
!kan) which doubles as a colloquial term for “women” (Lee 1979:124); in the names of tools 533 
among the Netsilik (Canada) which are selected as personal names for individuals as protection 534 
from misfortune (Balicki 1970:199-200); and among the Piraha (Brasil), the hunting bow (hóií) 535 
is used by men only, but the bowstring (hóií hoí) is made by the man’s wife, with the complete 536 
bow symbolising their union (Everett 2016).  These examples show raw materials and tools 537 
operating simultaneously across the semiotic range with their material properties integrated into 538 
making and transforming systems of meaning (Wallis 2013:209).   539 
 540 
Creating meaning with tools 541 
 As Killick (2001:77-78) observes, tool-related activities are contexts for learning from others, 542 
for creating and maintaining relationships, for reinforcing world views; they are not passive 543 
settings limited to functional ends.  Tools as symbols, icons and indexes bear multiple kinds of 544 
meaning and values depending on where they are made, used and seen.  From almost the start of 545 
their lives children learn the social value of objects, including tools, from adults who act as 546 
“symbol maker” with the child as pointing to things to make intentions clear, using objects in 547 
conventional socially agreed ways, and talking to the child (Rodríguez and Moro 2008:111; 548 
Tomasello 2005; West 2018).  The learning process is intimate, interactive, embodied, and 549 
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cumulative starting with perceptual categories moving to higher level conceptual categories 550 
(symbols) (Sloutsky 2010; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt 2013).  The physical relation between 551 
infant and parent (intersubjectivity) and the joint attention given to an object are both critical to 552 
word (symbol) learning (Studdert-Kennedy and Terrace 2017).  The cooperation involved in 553 
infant learning has parallels with a novice learning to make tools from an expert with words 554 
(speech and gestures) used to convey conceptually opaque actions and their consequences 555 
(Csibra and Gergeley 2011; Barham 2013; Herzlinger et al. 2017). Simple utterances of just a 556 
few words, as in a G1 grammar (“hit there”; “turn it over”), can greatly enhance knowledge 557 
transfer (Laland 2017). 558 
 559 
The study of social learning among hunter-gatherers provides insight into processes operating in 560 
recent small-scale, non-hierarchical societies and offer analogues of relevance here for the 561 
deeper evolutionary past (Marlowe 2005). Comparative studies show that at the community 562 
level, the transmission of knowledge and know-how is affected by demographic variables 563 
including size of age cohorts, rates of interaction between generations and with non-kin 564 
(Migliano et al. 2017).  For example, among the egalitarian Aka foragers (Central African 565 
Republic), most early learning (80%) takes place between parent and child, and this form of 566 
vertical transmission promotes stability while allowing for some individual variation (Hewlett 567 
and Cavalli-Sforza 1986:932).  From middle childhood on into adolescence more learning takes 568 
place from peers and unrelated adults (Hewlett 2016). Cross-cultural data shows that learning to 569 
make tools is similar to the pattern seen among the Aka, namely transmission of knowledge from 570 
parents and older children to the novice (MacDonald 2007), with increased  teaching (by verbal 571 
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instruction, demonstration, pointing) in early adolescence related to more complex technologies 572 
and demanding activities such as big game hunting (Lew-Levy et al. 2017).   573 
 574 
At the population level, quantitative modelling of social learning from an evolutionary 575 
perspective, predicts that the intensity of interaction between individuals and groups is more 576 
important for the transmission of information than is population size alone (Powell et al. 2009; 577 
Grove 2016). As the scale of analysis broadens to include social learning among Acheulean tool-578 
makers, then issues of habitat instability, population isolation and local extinctions add to the list 579 
of factors that disrupt cumulative learning (Hopkinson et al. 2013). 580 
 581 
Utilitarian or symbolic? 582 
Archaeologists have long recognised the difficulty of distinguishing style from function and by 583 
implication symbolic intent from functional design (Rouse 1960; Sackett 1982, 1986; Dibble 584 
1987; Dibble et al. 2016; Davidson and Noble 1993; McPherron 2000). Standardisation of tool 585 
forms may indicate symbolic content, but only if not imposed by functional constraints (Gowlett 586 
1996) or by selective bias imposed by archaeological typologies (Davidson 2002; Shea 2017).  587 
More problematical for a semiotic approach is the argument that artefacts can have “a practical 588 
function without having any symbolic significance whatever” (Chase and Dibble 1992:48).  589 
 590 
From a social constructionist point of view, the distinction between symbol and function is a 591 
false dichotomy.  The underlying source of this distinction is a dominant ideology in Western 592 
industrial society that leads us to expect that all behaviour should be goal-oriented, with a 593 
function that is a means to an end (Hodder 1982:164).  Utilitarianism permeates our dark matter, 594 
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(our unconscious, culturally articulated personal knowledge; Everett 2016) and archaeologists 595 
tend to be more comfortable equating symbol use with behaviours that do not have immediate 596 
functional value, such as ritual (Hawkes 1956).  Utility and symbolic value, however, are 597 
inseparable from social conventions (Hodder 1982, 2012).  A utilitarian purpose is a social 598 
construct (Skibo and Schiffer 2008), and “…even the most technical and mundane of acts 599 
implicates social aspects of life” (Hodder 1994:385).   From the perspective of Peirce’s 600 
semiotics, every article produced by a human society has the potential to carry conventional 601 
meaning, such as the humble butter knife which carries meaning as an index, icon and symbol 602 
depending on the context in which it is seen.  The challenge for archaeologists is to generate 603 
sufficient contextual information to identify levels of intention that reflect the use of symbols 604 
(Davidson 2002).  605 
 606 
The extraordinary longevity of Lower Palaeolithic tool technologies poses a potential problem to 607 
the constructionist and semiotic perspectives as we have no modern frame of reference for such 608 
enduring conventions (Ingold 1993). Hodder (1994:385), however, suggests that the “continuity 609 
and stability of form indicates Lower and Middle Palaeolithic handaxes clearly were made using 610 
rules” and the rules were social constructs even if they were implicit from social conditioning. 611 
As discussed below, there is an enduring set of ergonomic principles embedded in the making of 612 
handaxes and cleavers (Gowlett 2006). They may become implicit through experience or perhaps 613 
explicit as categorical concepts with semantic labels (Herzlinger et al. 2017).   614 
 615 
Rules apply also to short-term “end-goal” technologies such as scrapers.  The life history of 616 
scrapers from manufacture to discard reflects social conventions related to function, but also to 617 
30 
 
ontologies of technology (e.g., Arthur 2018).  At a practical level, lithic analysts can measure the 618 
variables that affect the effectiveness of a tool for a particular task (e.g., morphology, edge angle, 619 
use traces), and draw inferences on decisions made during the life history of the object (Preysler 620 
et al. 2018). Decision points identified by lithic analysts are etic observations, and though they 621 
can be independently verified they do not reflect the meanings once held by their makers. Those 622 
meanings are context specific and lost to us, but the existence of some level of meaning or 623 
signification (icon, index or symbol) can be inferred from 1) conventions in tool forms, 2) 624 
selection among equally effective tool-making strategies; and 3) in the choice to store (cache) 625 
tools for future use (below).  Symbolic content resides in each of these of these contexts given 626 
they are arbitrary social constructs.   627 
 628 
Conventions and categories among non-human primates 629 
Conventions for tool-use also exist among non-human primates, and most relevant here are 630 
longitudinal studies of chimpanzees which form the basis of recognizing local socially learned 631 
traditions or ‘cultures’ (Whiten 2005).  Byrne (2007:582) identifies signals of “culturally guided 632 
acquisition” in behaviours that are both intricate in complexity (multiple steps involved) and near 633 
uniform in a population. Among chimpanzees, the basic contexts in which tool use takes place 634 
include feeding, hygiene maintenance, threat displays, weapon use, and amusement (Goodall 635 
1986). The widest range of tool forms is associated with feeding.  Local traditions are recognized 636 
in central and west Africa including in similar habitats, which minimizes the role of adaptation as 637 
an explanation for variability (Whiten et al. 1999).  Learning of tool use takes place in social 638 
contexts by  imitation and emulation of others,  by individual trial and error (Whiten et al. 2009) 639 
and teaching using active intervention and provisioning of tools, typically from mother to 640 
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offspring (Musgrave et al. 2020). Teaching appears to be more common where the technology is 641 
relatively complex with multiple steps in its making (Musgrave et al. 2020), an observation of 642 
relevance when considering the complexities of making handaxes and cleavers (see below).  643 
 644 
Chimpanzees and other non-human primates, however, do not meet Davidson’s (2002) criteria 645 
for symbol-based tool use.  Although there are local traditions, tool forms are made with minimal 646 
elaboration when compared with human tools (Goodall 1986), and are task oriented, context 647 
specific and intended for immediate use (Gowlett 2015; Wynn and Gowlett 2018:25).  Despite 648 
these limitations, there is evidence for the capacity to conceptualise objects not just in terms of 649 
their physical properties, but also as more general categories such as ‘tool’ and types of tools 650 
(Goodall 1986).  This level of conceptualization is involved in human communication when 651 
establishing shared meaning for names, nouns and adverbs (Gärdenfors 2003; Medin and Rips 652 
2005).  Shared concepts are also essential for reaching understanding about objects or events not 653 
in the immediate environment, or of immediate experience.  Symbols, whether vocal or visual, 654 
externalize these shared understandings.  Bonobos and chimpanzees, trained to use symbols 655 
under controlled conditions, do use their training to communicate future intention, with one 656 
possible observation of symbol use in a natural context (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2004; Lyn et al. 657 
2011). Non-human primates in the wild and in captivity can recognize perceptual categories of 658 
objects, and may form more abstract conceptual categories (based on kind, such as food, 659 
predators) (e.g., Seyfarth and Cheney 2003; Pederson 2012; Vonk et al. 2013; Slocombe and 660 
Zuberbühler 2005). Chimpanzees, in their natural habitats do seem to recognize the differing 661 
properties of objects used as tools and can apply that understanding to other settings (Grüber et 662 




As well as socially learned traditions of tool use, chimpanzees (and bonobos) have evolved 665 
multi-modal forms of communication that integrate gestures, vocalisations and facial signals 666 
(Gillespie-Lynch et al. 2014). Gestural traditions of communication appear to be more variable 667 
in form than their range of vocalisations (Pollack and de Waal 2007).  From the perspective of 668 
quantitative linguistics, the structure of chimpanzee gestures follows mathematical laws seen in 669 
the transmission of information in human language linked to frequency of word/gesture use 670 
(Heeson et al. 2019). The similarities in structure point to commonalities in primate 671 
communication that have great evolutionary depth (Boë et al. 2019).   672 
 673 
Chimpanzee vocal repertoires are often characterised as context specific impulsive (emotional) 674 
responses with a limited range or intention, but there is increasing evidence of variation in 675 
response to social context (Hopkins et al. 2007), to food types (Slocombe and Zuberbühler 2005; 676 
Kalan et al. 2015) and awareness of the perspectives of others (intentionality) (Crockford et al. 677 
2017).  The learning of new grunts for a particular food (apples) was recorded among 678 
chimpanzees transferred to a new zoo where the resident chimpanzee group had a different grunt 679 
for the same food (Watson et al. 2015).  The incomers gradually learned the existing referential 680 
grunt, but only after social bonds were developed between the groups.  This is evidence of the 681 
capacity for vocalisations linked to objects and learned collectively which lies at the root of 682 
symbol generation through constructing words;  683 
 684 
Words in Peirce’s semiotics are symbols, and the labelling of objects is so entrenched in our 685 
learning of language that we take for granted this facility to categorise and focus attention on a 686 
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class of objects (Clark 2011).  Labels – not syntax – are at the core of language (even for some 687 
Minimalist linguists, e.g. Murphy 2015), and at some stage in the gradual evolution of language 688 
the transition from visual to verbal labelling took place (Corballis 2002; Gentilucci and Corballis 689 
2006).  If categorization is emergent in non-human primates and ubiquitous among modern 690 
humans, then parsimony points to the evolution of symbol use – and language – long before 691 
Homo sapiens.  Pederson (2012) concludes, following a study of the ability of captive bonobos 692 
to acquire visual and auditory symbols, that language evolved from deep rooted semantic and 693 
conceptual abilities in the last common ancestor of chimpanzees and hominins, some six million 694 
years ago and in recent work it is argued that the neural, auditory pathway for language evolved 695 
at least 25 million years ago among monkeys (Balezeau et al. 2020).  The shared inheritance is 696 
based on biological and cognitive similarities in how humans and apes experience the world 697 
through their bodies and senses (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).  698 
 699 
Lower Palaeolithic Tools as Symbols 700 
Stone tool working constitutes the longest record of hominin technology, with the earliest 701 
evidence from 3.3 million years ago (Ma) in East Africa, pre-dating the emergence of the genus 702 
Homo (Harmand et al. 2015).  Preservation biases favour stone over organic materials in the 703 
archaeological record with bone and horn core use found in South African cave deposits after 1.8 704 
Ma in association with more than one hominin (Barham and Mitchell 2008).  In East Africa, the 705 
earliest evidence of bone use comes from Olduvai Gorge between 1.8 Ma and 1.6 Ma, probably 706 
associated with Homo erectus, and in the form of bone hammers and a bone handaxe (Backwell 707 
and d’Errico 2005). The earliest evidence of wood-working takes the form of plant residues on 708 
2.0 Ma tools from Kanjera South (Tanzania) (Lemorini et al. 2014), but the oldest probable 709 
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wooden artefact is substantially later (~780 ka) in association with the Acheulean site of Gesher 710 
Benot Ya’aqov (Israel) (Belitzky et al. 1991), which also has early evidence for the control of 711 
fire (Alperson-Afil et al. 2017).  712 
 713 
These non-stone technologies are relevant in the context of language evolution and semiotics 714 
because they provide evidence for the extension of the range of cultural choices for tool use to 715 
other materials. Our focus, however, is early lithic technology as it is the most widespread 716 
evidence base.  The evidence includes conventions of tool forms, choice of manufacturing 717 
strategy, and stages in the life history of a tool that indicate the concept of displacement or 718 
detached thought (Hockett 1960).  Complementary sources of data drawn from evolutionary 719 
cognitive archaeology are incorporated into this section where relevant. 720 
  721 
Icons to symbols in the archaeological record 722 
The archaeological record before 1 Ma is reviewed briefly here in setting the context for the 723 
evolution of symbol use and language.  Using Peirce’s triad of signs, a tentative claim can be 724 
made for the early use of icons in the Pliocene which overlaps with the oldest evidence for stone-725 
tool making.  The Oldowan Industry of the Early Pleistocene provides the backdrop of 726 
behaviours elaborated later in the Acheulean. These include strategies of raw material selection, 727 
learned techniques of core reduction and tool-making.   Our focus then diverges with a focus on 728 
evidence for regionally variable strategies for biface making after 1 Ma, and another on the 729 
growing evidence for sea travel in Southeast Asia.  Both behavioural complexes reflect, at a 730 




The earliest possible evidence of an intentionally interpreted and contemplated icon is associated 733 
with Australopithecus africanus at the site of Makapansgat Cave, South Africa.  The deposits are 734 
dated to between 4.12 and 2.16 million years old (Herries 2003). A red cobble was found in the 735 
deposits, and was probably brought to the site by an australopithecine rather than by natural 736 
processes (Bednarik 1998).  The cobble has erosional marks on both surfaces that resemble a 737 
primate face with eyes and mouth (Bednarik 1998).  The physical resemblance to a face qualifies 738 
this object as an icon in our eyes, and presumably in the eyes of the hominin beholders.  Other 739 
icons resembling human forms or elements of anatomy occur considerably later, after 800 ka in 740 
the North African and Southwest Asian records (Bednarik 1997, 2003; Marshack 1997). 741 
 742 
The Makapansgat pebble is roughly coeval with the earliest stone working technology currently 743 
known.  The site of Lomekwi 3, West Turkana, Kenya (Harmand et al. 2015) preserves evidence 744 
of the deliberate detachment of large basalt flakes using a block on block technique.   Using the 745 
reasoning of Chase (1991), these flakes are iconic objects created as a result of an understanding 746 
of the cause and effect relationship of striking a block of basalt against a stone anvil.  In Cousin’s 747 
(2014) semiotic coevolution, the process of making these flakes, which involves selecting the 748 
raw materials and applying force, is an act of interpretation (of physical properties) to create 749 
something new, and to do so more than once. In his Baldwinian model of the coevolution of 750 
language and technology, Lomekwi 3 marks an early emergence of a social learning niche 751 
among hominins. 752 
 753 
For the time being, there is a gap of 700,000 years between the flakes and cores at Lomekwi 3 754 
and the earliest Oldowan at 2.6 Ma (Stout et al. 2010).  The early Oldowan arguably marks the 755 
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beginning of cumulative, learned culture with this contention supported by experimental 756 
replication of core reduction strategies that indicate learning by copying (Morgan et al. 2015; 757 
Stout et al. 2019).   By 2.0 Ma, Oldowan-like assemblages of flakes, cores and a limited range of 758 
small retouched tools (scrapers, notches, denticulates) are found in Southwest and Central Asia, 759 
India and China (Barsky et al. 2018).  Standardised tool forms are rare, but other behaviours 760 
relevant to the development of symbol are evident.  The site of Kanjera South, Kenya (2.0 Ma) 761 
provides the first evidence for the selection and transport of raw materials up to 13 km to a 762 
central locality where a range of activities took place including stone tool-making, butchery of 763 
small antelopes (possibly hunted), working of wood, and processing soft plant matter including 764 
underground storage organs (Braun et al. 2009; Ferraro et al. 2013; Lemorini et al. 2014).  765 
 766 
The selection and transport of raw materials some distance from the intended place of use has 767 
cognitive implications in terms of foresight (planning, long-term memory). It may also indicate a 768 
social value (meaning) was placed on these materials. There is evidence from earlier in the 769 
Oldowan of the selection of raw materials and the carrying of artefacts across landscapes to 770 
favoured localities (Potts 1991; Kroll 1997; Stout et al. 2005).  The broader social interpretation 771 
of the Kanjera locality is that it was repeatedly used by tool-dependent cooperative groups 772 
(Plummer and Bishop 2016).  The pragmatics of symbol development and learning involve 773 
individuals interacting face to face in contexts associated with tools and their use (Gärdenfors 774 
2004; Tomasello 2005; Rodriguez and Moro 2008). Kanjera South offers an early example of the 775 
kind of setting conducive to social learning that predates the evolution of Homo erectus.   776 
  777 
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The earliest evidence of large retouched tool forms marks the beginning of the Acheulean 778 
Technocomplex 1.75 million years ago in Africa, and the subsequent spread of its distinctive 779 
tools made on large flakes (>10 cm) and blocks of stone into Southwest Asia, Europe, South 780 
Asia and parts of East Asia (de la Torre 2016; Barsky et al. 2018).  The characteristic retouched 781 
tool forms include handaxes, cleavers, picks and knives (Figure 4a-c).  Their making requires 782 
additional steps in planning compared with Oldowan cores and flakes, with greater spatial and 783 
temporal separation of stages of making and use (Muller et al. 2017).  The handaxe and cleaver 784 
are distinguished from Oldowan tools by their large size (>10 cm), but particularly by their 785 
bilateral and plan form symmetry (Shipton et al. 2018).  Symmetrical handaxes occur early in the 786 
Acheulean 1.7 Ma marking an elaborated attention to form over function which distinguishes 787 
these tools from Oldowan retouched tools (Diez-Martína et al. 2019). This focus on form 788 
becomes more widespread from ~1.2 Ma with some regional trends towards greater refinement 789 
(Shipton et al. 2018), but not in all parts of the Acheulean range (e.g., McNabb and Cole 2015).  790 
A broader range of small tools also occurs in the Acheulean some of which appear to be 791 
conventional forms such as awls, denticulates, and scrapers (Isaac and Isaac 1997; de la Torre 792 
and Mora 2005; Dominguez-Rodrigo et al 2009), but our interest lies in the large retouched 793 
forms and their extended production sequences as evidence of early symbol use. 794 
 795 
Homo erectus (sensu lato) is the hominin generally associated with the Acheulean up to 1.0 Ma 796 
(Antón et al. 2015), after which other taxa continued the tradition in Africa, Eurasia and South 797 
Asia (Moncel and Schreve 2016).  In Africa, handaxes and cleavers were made as recently as 798 
212 ka and possibly by Homo sapiens (Benito Calvo et al. 2014).  In Europe, handaxes appear 799 
sporadically in contexts associated with late Middle Pleistocene Neanderthals (de Lumley et al., 800 
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2004; Preysler et al. 2018). In north central India, bifaces were still being made as recently as 801 
100 ka (Shipton et al. 2013), and presumably by H. sapiens.    802 
 803 
The stability of handaxes and cleavers as symmetrical tool forms across the long span and wide 804 
geographical distribution of the Acheulean has sparked decades of speculation about their social 805 
and cognitive implications (see summary in Lycett and Gowlett 2008).  At one end of the 806 
interpretative spectrum are theories of minimal behavioural intention involved in the making of 807 
these tools, and minimal social learning (Tennie et al. 2016).  The shapes may have resulted from 808 
use as cores, from re-sharpening, from differences in raw materials, from an inherent perceptual 809 
bias for symmetry in hominins, or they were under some genetic control (Davidson and Noble 810 
1993; McPherron 2000; White 1998; Hodgson 2015; Corbey et al. 2016).  At the other end of the 811 
interpretative spectrum are claims for symmetry signalling genetic fitness or trustworthiness of 812 
the maker to conspecifics (Kohn and Mithen 1996; Spikins 2012), and more generally as 813 
deliberately imposed and socially transmitted forms (Shipton et al. 2018).    814 
 815 
Experimental work has demonstrated the difficulty in producing symmetrical forms, and the 816 
importance of learned skill in managing the thinness of the tool and the straightness of the edges 817 
(Lycett et al. 2016; Shipton and Nielsen 2018).  This research undermines the argument that 818 
learning to make bifaces is easy and could be independently invented by trial and error during 819 
the process of alternate edge flaking (Davidson 2002; Tennie et al. 2016).  The argument that 820 
handaxe symmetry reflects increased reduction intensity has been tested quantitatively with flake 821 
scar density and symmetry found to be largely independent variables (Shipton et al. 2018).  822 
Experimental work has also shown that raw material differences are not a primary limiting factor 823 
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in handaxe form (Lycett et al. 2016; García-Medrano et al. 2019; Key 2019). An innate human 824 
perceptual bias towards symmetry (Hodgson 2015) has also been challenged through 825 
experimental work (Shipton et al. 2018).  The suggestion of some genetic control of symmetry is 826 
undermined by the temporal and regional variability in the Acheulean (Hosfield et al. 2018), and 827 
the absence of handaxes in regions populated by Homo erectus despite having suitable raw 828 
materials (Wynn and Gowlett 2018).  Handaxe dimensions and shape can change with persistent 829 
re-sharpening or thinning (McPherron 2000), but intended shape (final form) is evident on 830 
bifaces made on flakes with little subsequent shaping (Sharon 2008; Li et al. 2014; Malinsky-831 
Buller 2016; Preysler et al. 2018), and on cobbles (façonnage) indicating knapping to a plan  832 
(García-Medrano et al. 2019). 833 
 834 
Handaxes as standardised forms 835 
The debate on the intentionality of biface symmetry has shifted towards a consensus that 836 
although there is regional and chronological variability in these forms, the handaxe and cleaver 837 
were socially transmitted, learned constellations of knowledge (Shipton et al. 2018).   They meet 838 
Davidson’s (2002) criterion of standardisation, and are not the products of expediency or 839 
figments of archaeological typology (cf. Shea 2017).  Within the constellations that separate the 840 
handaxe form (pointed, symmetrical) from cleavers (divergent, symmetrical) are potential 841 
interpretants (signs) that linked form with meaning (see Discussion, Point 5). Of particular 842 
relevance is the case made for a set of six “design imperatives” or ergonomics based variables 843 
linked to the use of these objects as hand-held tools (Gowlett 2006) (Figure 5): 1) a rounded base 844 
to fit the hand; 2) extension of the working edge and thinned tip to maintain balance; 3) bifacial 845 
trimming to support the working edge; 4) extension of the sides to minimize twisting during use; 846 
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5) adjustment of overall thickness to control the weight; and 6) a slight adjustment of the 847 
symmetry to work with the handedness of the user.  This constellation of options provides the 848 
tool maker with scope for variation around a basic size-shape framework, with decisions about 849 
the weighting of the variables made during knapping.  These geometrical concepts carry meaning 850 
that may reduce the cognitive load in what is a demanding hierarchical, multivariate process of 851 
construction (Gowlett 2006:218). 852 
  853 
We cannot know which of the design rules signalled meaning, or if the overall symmetrical 854 
shape of the object was a bridging sign.  In Peirce’s semiotic framework a sign can be 855 
simultaneously an index, icon and symbol.  Handaxes and cleavers could be indexes of tasks to 856 
be performed (e.g., cutting, chopping); icons of one another (they represent a pattern of tool 857 
design); and symbols of the cultural values they were designed to support, such as the identity of 858 
the maker (Cole 2012), and appropriate contexts of use and discard.  In Donald’s (1991) model 859 
of a gradual evolution of language, language becomes evident with the development of external 860 
forms for storing and transmitting conventional cultural knowledge. Externalised symbols 861 
require socially understood routes of access to their meaning which can be communicated 862 
through sight, touch, sound, gesture and speech (Donald 1991:131).  Handaxes and cleavers as 863 
enduring conventions of tool-making could serve as externalised storage of cultural knowledge, 864 
with the specifics of that knowledge inaccessible to the modern viewer, and not needed to 865 
interpret these forms as potential symbols. 866 
 867 
Choice among ways of making - equifinality 868 
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The social constructionist approach to identifying social conventions seeks evidence of choices 869 
made where multiple options exist, each equally effective in satisfying an aim (Killick 2004).  In 870 
the context of the Acheulean, options exists in the making of handaxes and cleavers starting with 871 
the basic choice of reduction method.  The tool can be made on a flake struck from a core 872 
(debitage) or by reducing a block or core (façonnage) (Marshall and Gamble 2001). The use of 873 
large flakes (>10 cm) as blanks for these two tool forms appears from the very start of the 874 
Acheulean in East Africa (de la Torre and Mora 2005) and occurs widely, after ~1 million years 875 
ago, in Southwest Asia, India and in Iberia (Sharon 2008; 2009; Preysler et al. 2018). Over this 876 
broad geographical range Acheulean tool-makers devised as many as nine different strategies, 877 
each with multiple steps, for managing large cores to produce flake blanks (Sharon 2009; 878 
Shipton et al. 2013; Akhilesh and Pappu 2015; Li et al. 2017).  These methods involve different 879 
approaches to handling three-dimensional volumes and working them hierarchically to produce 880 
blanks.  The methods differ substantially enough that the decision to pursue one option precludes 881 
others, and needs to be taken early in the reduction process. There are regional variants as well 882 
with the Victoria West technique distinct to South Africa (Li et al. 2017) and the Tabelbala- 883 
Tachengit technique and the Kerzaz core method found only in small areas of North Africa 884 
(Sharon 2009).  These three strategies are technically complex, with the Victoria West method, 885 
dated to approximately 1Ma comparable in complexity of volumetric control to the Levallois 886 
technique associated with Middle Palaeolithic/Middle Stone Age technologies after 300 ka (Li et 887 
al. 2017).   888 
 889 
The variety of strategies for meeting similar functional needs (equifinality) and their regional as 890 
well as chronological differences reflect capacities for innovation and social transmission across 891 
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the Acheulean range (Sharon 2009).  The complexity and standardisation of the prepared core 892 
approaches, such as Victoria West, have been interpreted as indirect evidence of technical 893 
knowledge learned through language (Sharon and Beaumont 2006).   Experimental evidence 894 
from neuroimaging research supports the coevolution of neural networks that underpin language 895 
and tool-making (Uomini and Meyer 2013; Stout et al. 2015 and references within).  The 896 
teaching of tool-making is hypothesised as the recurring behavioural context which coupled 897 
cognitive structures supporting communication and motor systems, leading to the evolution of 898 
language (Kolodny and Edelman 2018).  We would add that the teaching of tool-making also 899 
involves the basic parent-offspring relationship of learning through physical proximity 900 
(intersubjectivity) and joint attention on a shared task (Studdert-Kennedy and Terrace 2017). 901 
Controlled experiments on learning to make stone tools provide more specific evidence that 902 
learning the nested hierarchical processes needed to make a handaxes, such as alternate bifacial 903 
flaking, edge and platform preparation (involving the non-dominant hand), requires teaching 904 
using language (speech and gesture) to minimise errors in transmission between expert and 905 
novice (Uomini and Meyer 2013; Putt, Wood and Franciscus 2014; Ruck 2014; Morgan et al. 906 
2015; Lombao et al. 2017; Ruck and Uomini in press).  Gärdenfors and Högberg (2017:196, 907 
table 1) outline a hierarchy of forms of intentional teaching and levels of joint attention and 908 
theory of mind between teacher and pupil. They link these levels to increasing difficulty of 909 
transmitting an understanding of patterning or concepts to the extent that language is required, as 910 
in the case of learning to make an Acheulean handaxe using soft hammer techniques.  The 911 
multiplicity of production phases (sub-goals) that need to be completed to move to the next stage 912 
of production add to the levels of knowledge (planning depth) to be transmitted and understood.  913 
In the case of bifacially thinned handaxes, a cause and effect understanding of sub-goals 914 
43 
 
associated with bevelling (flaking) and abrading platform edges cannot be understood from 915 
copying the actions alone; teaching with language is required (Gärdenfors and Högberg 916 
2017:198-9).
3
  Mahaney (2014) in a detailed study of single expert knapper draws parallels 917 
between the complexities of soft hammer thinning of handaxes with the production of sentences 918 
in the English language.  The parallels illustrate the skill levels involved and not the kind of 919 
language or grammar required to make a handaxe.  A G1 language in our typology lacks 920 
recursion in its structure, but places no restriction on the capacity for recursive thought. As 921 
Everett (2005, 2012, 2017) and Pullum (2020) have argued, recursive thinking does not require a 922 
recursive grammar and there is there is no evidence for a one-to-one mapping of thought onto 923 
language. (Everett 2017).  924 
 925 
A cognitive analysis of cleaver production provides additional insights on the linkage between 926 
planning depth, expertise and the role of language in managing the cognitive demands of this 927 
craft (Herzlinger et al. 2017).  Cleavers made from large flakes struck from large cores differs 928 
from that of handaxes in not being produced by retouch, but instead by the planned management 929 
of the core before the cleaver blank is struck (Sharon 2008).  The planning begins with the 930 
selection of raw material and cleavers tend to be made more consistently on coarser-grained 931 
rocks than handaxes.  This preference occurs across the geographical and time range of the large 932 
                                                        
3 Karl Lee, a primitive technologist with 25 years of experience making handaxes observes 
“Edge maintenance is invariably where students go wrong…. Angle of abrasion can have a 
dramatic effect on the intended removal in terms of width, depth and risk of problems such 
as overshooting. One particular problem is 'triangles!'. Even a 1mm raised speck on an 
abraded edge/platform can be the difference between a clean removal or a damaged 
hard/soft hammer, or preform. Even a tiny triangular irregularity can be incredibly strong, 
requiring more than twice the force (and risk) to take a removal. One over or under 
abraded edge could ruin the entire piece.  Instruction regarding abrasion and abrasion 
angles, technique and highlighted dangers, would be difficult without even a rudimentary 
form of language.” (2 July 2020: https://www.primitive-technology.co.uk/) 
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flake tradition of blank production and arguably reflects the socially agreed functions of this tool 933 
form (Sharon 2008:1332-3). At the 780,000 year-old site of Gesher Benot Ya’aqov (GBY) 934 
(Israel), three different core and flake management strategies were used to produce wedge-935 
shaped working edges (Levallois-like, Kombewa, and blank delineation by retouch) (Herzlinger 936 
et al. 2017).  Each strategy involved a different set of hierarchical steps with sub-goals, with the 937 
choice of strategy made early in the chaîne opératoire. A technical and cognitive analysis of the 938 
production sequences of GBY cleavers draws on the concept of expert cognition (Wynn et al. 939 
2017). Modern experts in craft tool-making share a set of characteristics provide a template for 940 
considering the level of skilled technical cognition to make cleavers (and handaxes).  Craft 941 
knowledge took years to learn, and with mastery of the craft came great accuracy and reliability 942 
in production, a capacity for rapid in-depth assessments of problems and making  adjustments, a 943 
capacity to focus and retain that focus after an interruption without a loss of intention (Wynn et 944 
al. 2017:23).  In the context of the GBY cleavers strategies, Herzlinger et al. (2017:11) conclude: 945 
 946 
“The number of categories may have been fewer than one would find with a modern 947 
expert, but categories were definitely present in the minds of the GBY knappers. Further, 948 
it would seem likely, though this is impossible to know, that the GBY knappers had 949 
declarative/semantic labels for these concepts, either in the form of vocal words or 950 
perhaps gestures (we favor the former)”.    951 
 952 
This proposed linkage between the complex nested routines of cleaver-making and the use of 953 
symbols (words) as scaffolds for managing the sequencing of tasks, complements neuroimaging 954 
research on shared networks for tool-making and language (Uomini and Meyer 2013; Meyer et 955 
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al. 2014; Stout et al. 2015; Putt et al. 2019), and the experimental studies showing the 956 
effectiveness of teaching with language in learning complex tool-making routines (Morgan et al. 957 
2015; Lombao 2017).   958 
 959 
In summary, the arbitrary (conventional) forms of handaxes and cleavers are symbols in Peirce’s 960 
triad (1998) because they bear no inherent relationship to their functions (Shipton et al. 2018). 961 
These forms are social constructs that can serve as icons, indexes and symbols depending on 962 
contexts in which they are perceived and the knowledge of the viewer. Attention to form 963 
appeared early in the Acheulean, and becomes more common after one million years ago (below) 964 
with the development of soft hammer thinning. The complexity of biface production, in 965 
particular the process of thinning exceeds the capacity for a novice to understand cause and 966 
effect from observation alone.  Teaching with words arguably becomes a necessity to gain 967 
technical mastery (Morgan et al. 2015; Gärdenfors and Högberg 2017).  Language may have 968 
evolved in the context of the needs of teaching increasingly complex coordinated actions.  In 969 
such contexts, whether tool-making, foraging or hunting, simple sentences would give teachers a 970 
low cost means of transmitting information with greater precision than possible with gestures 971 
alone (Laland 2017: 227-8).  A G1 language with its linear sequencing of words would fulfil this 972 
need.  973 
 974 
After one million years ago 975 
The Middle Pleistocene archaeological record between 1 Ma and 300 ka shows increasing 976 
behavioural variability across continents, which we argue reflects the impact of symbol-based 977 
language on  cognitive evolution (encephalisation) and the evolution of an extended childhood as 978 
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a period of social learning  (Antón et al. 2015).  Culturally transmitted conventions of tool-979 
making and tool-use change in the Acheulean as seen in the shift in Southwest Asia by 500 ka 980 
away from the large flake tradition with its giant cores, use of coarse raw materials, and abundant 981 
cleavers towards smaller cores and finer-grained materials for making handaxes and the 982 
discontinuation of cleavers as a tool form (Sharon 2008; Malinsky-Buller 2016).  In Western 983 
Europe subtle regional variations emerge in biface conventions among contemporary groups 984 
between 500 ka – 400 ka (White 1998; Ashton 2016; White and Foulds 2018; García-Medrano et 985 
al. 2019). In Britain, a distinctive range of handaxe forms exists with some forms difficult to 986 
make and these two features are interpreted as evidence of socially transmitted norms (Shipton & 987 
White 2020).  988 
 989 
Innovations in knapping methods also emerge after one million years ago in Africa, India, 990 
Southwest Asia and Europe including the use of ‘soft’ organic hammers or softer stone hammers 991 
to thin handaxes (Clark et al. 2001; Galloti et al. 2010; Galloti & Mussi 2017; Shipton 2016, 992 
Shipton 2018, Malinsky-Buller 2018; Stout et al. 2014). As discussed, soft hammer thinning 993 
requires not only an understanding of the properties of the hammer and its use, but also the need 994 
for embedded routines linked to edge management and thinning (Mahaney 2014). Teaching with 995 
language is argued to be necessary to transmit this conceptually opaque knowledge (Csibra and 996 
Gergely 2011; Gärdenfors and Högberg 2017).  From a neural perspective the hierarchical 997 
organisation of these additional sub-routines of biface making is linked to cognitive control 998 




This understanding of the properties of other materials combined with increasingly extended 1001 
production sequences would be the foundation for the invention of hafting later in the Middle 1002 
Pleistocene with its added complexities of composite hierarchical constructions (Ambrose 2010; 1003 
Barham 2013). Other innovations in the Acheulean include a new tool form, the ‘handpoint’ in 1004 
East Africa and Spain (Gowlett 2013; Preysler et al. 2018), the making of blades in East Africa 1005 
from ~550 ka (Johnson and McBrearty 2010) and the use of Levallois prepared cores for making 1006 
cleaver blanks in the late Acheulean of East Africa (Tryon et al. 2006).  The use of ochre also 1007 
enters the archaeological record in southern Africa between 500 ka – 400 ka (Watts et al. 2016), 1008 
adding to the diversity of recurrent, conventionalised behaviours linked to working stone  1009 
 1010 
The life history of bifaces 1011 
 1012 
The final criterion in Davidson’s (2002) framework for recognising the use of symbol-based 1013 
language is the separation of the making tools from their use.  Preysler et al. (2018) reconstruct 1014 
the life history of handaxes and cleavers at Gesher Benot Ya’aqov (Israel) and at later sites in 1015 
central Spain.  Common to both localities is a production sequence starting with the selection of 1016 
suitable rocks or active quarrying to obtain the raw material with cores shaped at the raw 1017 
material source then large flakes were struck from the cores and initially shaped by retouch with 1018 
final shaping usually away from the raw material source.  The tools were then transported to 1019 
places of use, where some were re-sharpened, used and then discarded.   1020 
 1021 
The life history sequence also includes an important option in the context of symbol use which is 1022 
to store or cache unused tools in anticipation of predicted needs. Caches of raw materials and 1023 
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tools represent future planning (Kuhn 1992), and this behaviour has been observed among 1024 
individual captive great apes (Osvath 2009; Osvath and Karvonen 2012) and in the wild (e.g., 1025 
Boesch and Boesch 1984).   In the case of collective caching “cooperation about detached goals 1026 
requires that the inner worlds of the individuals be coordinated. It seems hard to explain how this 1027 
can be done without evoking symbolic communication” (Gärdenfors 2004:6). There is tentative 1028 
evidence for caching in the late Acheulean of Spain (Méndez-Quintas 2018:3) and more 1029 
persuasive evidence at Gesher Benot Ya’aqov (Preysler et al. 2018:131).  The latter site also 1030 
provides evidence of contexts for extended social interaction necessary for transmitting 1031 
knowledge, including symbols, across generations.  The lake shore locality was used over a 1032 
period of 100,000 years for activities including animal and plant food processing, the working of 1033 
stone and wood, making fire and caching handaxes (Goren-Inbar 2011).  The caching of these 1034 
large, unused tools in the landscape indicates provisioning of places rather than provisioning of 1035 
individuals (Kuhn 1992:192). 1036 
 1037 
Evidence for future planning, and by implication symbol-based language also occurs early in the 1038 
Acheulean of East Africa 1.4 Ma at Koobi Fora (Kenya) with the allocation of different areas of 1039 
a contemporaneous landscape to separate stages in the making and use of handaxes 1040 
(Presnayakova et al. 2018).  This spatial fragmentation of the life history of handaxes extends the 1041 
time depth and evidence base for H. erectus communicating shared abstractions using language.  1042 
In the context of a gradualist model of language evolution, the roots of symbol use and G1 1043 
grammars may lie in shared activities such as the persistent provisioning of raw materials at 1044 
Kanjera two million years ago which involved planning actions distant in time and space 1045 




Middle Pleistocene Seafaring 1048 
The onset of the Middle Pleistocene, roughly 900,000 – 780,000 years ago marks a transition to 1049 
increasingly variable and harsh climatic conditions (Head and Gibbard 2005).  H. erectus is 1050 
widespread by this time having settled China and Southeast Asia, including Java.  The earliest 1051 
Acheulean in Java is dated to about one million years old (Simanjuntak 2010).  Sea level 1052 
fluctuations linked to the waxing and waning of glacial stages meant periodic isolation of some 1053 
island populations.  Parts of Indonesia were never linked to the Asian mainland and the 1054 
Acheulean did not spread beyond Java.  East of Java on the island of Flores, however, there is an 1055 
archaeological record of stone tool-making from one million years ago, primarily flakes, without 1056 
handaxes, cleavers or picks (Brumm et al. 2010).  1057 
 1058 
As argued above, tools are symbols and the handaxe and cleaver as standardised forms provide 1059 
indirect evidence of cultural traditions and at least a G1 level of language. The absence or rarity 1060 
of these tools in the Southeast Asian record poses a challenge in this respect for the early 1061 
language hypothesis. That challenge is met by considering another aspect of the regional 1062 
behavioural record that reflects extended future planning based on language. The settlement of 1063 
Flores and other islands of Wallacea by H. erectus or related taxa is arguably a process that 1064 
required language to collectively plan and execute the crossing of open bodies of water 1065 
(Davidson and Noble 1993).  Wallacea is a transitional biogeographic zone unique in having 1066 
islands that were never connected to the mainland of Southeast Asia (Sunda), or to 1067 
Australia/New Guinea (Sahul) (Kealy et al. 2016). Sea crossings would have been necessary for 1068 
hominins to settle these islands (Bednarik 1997), and the arrival of Homo sapiens in Australia 1069 
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some 50-60,000 years ago is often cited as a reliable indicator of the necessity of language for 1070 
planning a sea crossing of 90 km (Davidson and Noble 1992).  Building a boat requires the kind 1071 
of conceptualisation of an arbitrary form intended for an imagined purpose that is only possible 1072 
by the use of symbols to convey such abstractions.  Constructing a boat or raft involves joining 1073 
multiple parts to function as a whole, a form of extended hafting. Provisioning of water, food and 1074 
having the capacity to fish would be part of the planning process. By this logic, evidence for the 1075 
earlier settlement of Wallacea would imply an earlier use of language. 1076 
 1077 
Bednarik (1997, 1998) drew attention to the published archaeological evidence for stone-tools on 1078 
the island of Flores associated with fossil fauna in the Soa Basin, palaeomagnetically dated to 1079 
~700 ka.  The tool-makers were attributed to Homo erectus based on well-known fossil evidence 1080 
on Java, and Bednarik speculated on the kinds of watercraft needed for travelling between the 1081 
islands.  To reach Flores from Bali involved crossing two islands (Lombok, Sumbawa) and 1082 
distances of 10 km of open water.  Subsequent research in Wallacea has identified submerged 1083 
islands that at a sea level 45m lower than today could have been staging posts for a north-south 1084 
connection between Sulawesi and Sumbawa/Flores, offering additional food resources for 1085 
dispersing hominins (Kealy et al. 2015).  Lower sea levels would have existed during glacial 1086 
maxima in the Middle Pleistocene, and presumably other islands would have been emerged as 1087 
habitats for coast adapted communities.   1088 
 1089 
The radiometric dating of the archaeological record on Flores has extended a hominin presence 1090 
to 1 Ma (Brumm 2010) and there is fossil evidence for a hominin ancestor of Homo floresiensis 1091 
on the island 800 ka (van den Bergh et al. 2016). The largest island of Wallacea - Sulawesi – is 1092 
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now known to have been occupied by hominins at least 200 ka (van den Bergh et al. 2016), and 1093 
there is evidence for hominins in the Philippines, north of Wallacea, ~700 ka in the form of stone 1094 
tools among the remains of a butchered rhinoceros (Ingicco et al. 2018).   1095 
 1096 
Despite the uncertainty about which hominins settled these islands (Cooper and Stringer 2013), 1097 
the evidence is accumulating for multiple sea crossings in the early Middle Pleistocene.  The 1098 
short crossings between the islands of Wallacea, though less demanding the long crossing to 1099 
Australia with no landmass apparent, also required shared awareness of a future goal, not unlike 1100 
the caching of handaxes.  Language would be necessary in this context for constructing 1101 
watercraft and storing provisions (food and water), and a G1 language would be sufficient to 1102 
convey the information required to navigate between visible islands (Gil 2009). Ongoing 1103 
experimental building and testing of rafts using local knowledge of plant resources (e.g., bamboo 1104 
poles, vine bindings and rope making) has demonstrated the feasibility of crossing distances of 1105 
20 km to 50 km by H. erectus using rafts with paddles (Bednarik 2014).  The intentional 1106 
settlement of these islands by genetically viable populations is a more parsimonious explanation 1107 
than the accidental seeding of hominins on islands by tsunamis or other random natural processes 1108 
(e.g., Ruxton and Wilkinson 2012). 1109 
 1110 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 1111 
“Finally, there is the fact that many quite reasonable hypotheses in the historical 1112 
behavioral sciences cannot, as a practical matter, be refuted absolutely. It is possible to 1113 
choose among alternative hypotheses in terms of their relative probability…”  1114 




Throughout this paper we have drawn evidence from a range of sources in support of the 1117 
contentious claim that language evolved earlier in hominin evolution than is normally accepted 1118 
(Belfer-Cohen and Goren-Inbar 1994; Sharon 2009; Goren-Inbar 2011).  Homo erectus rather 1119 
than Homo sapiens was the first ancestor to generate symbols, and symbols are the essential 1120 
component of language, not syntax (Hurford 2004; Piantadosi and Fedorenko 2017; Studdert-1121 
Kennedy and Terrace 2017).  Our conclusion derives from our reading of Peirce’s semiotic 1122 
progression and its application to the archaeological record against criteria set by Noble and 1123 
Davidson (1996) for the recognition of language in tools. As the work by Steels (2005) suggests, 1124 
even all the later additions to the basic symbolic system and grammar of language are the filling-1125 
in of the semiotics of language (see also Everett 2017, 197ff for a discussion of how language 1126 
complexity can develop over time, from a simple G1 grammar).   1127 
 1128 
We outlined at the outset five questions posed by Ingold (1993:337) for those who would 1129 
interpret handaxes as evidence for early language.  We respond as follows:  1130 
1) There cannot be a modern analogue for the longevity of the Acheulean given the present is 1131 
short. The longevity of the handaxe (and cleaver) as recurrent forms is evidence of cultural 1132 
norms (Hodder 1994) that reflect stabilised solutions to particular needs (Pinch and Bijker 1984; 1133 
Deacon 1997) that were transmitted over generations in small-scale societies by natural 1134 
pedagogy including teaching using language (Csibra and Gergely 2011; Lew-Levy et al. 2017).  1135 
Small population sizes and limited rates of interaction inhibited rapid innovation (Hopkinson et 1136 
al. 2013);  1137 
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2) The persistence of these forms necessitated cultural transmission given the complex 1138 
hierarchical processes of manufacture (Morgan et al. 2015; Gärdenfors and Högberg 2017; 1139 
Herzlinger et al. 2017), and the range (temporal and geographical) of available alternative 1140 
strategies to achieve similar ends (Sharon 2009) – these are cultural choices (e.g., Killick 2004; 1141 
Byrne 2004);  1142 
3) Representational models of tool-making are being challenged (Fairlie and Barham 2016; 1143 
Overmann and Wynn 2019) in recognition that the process is embodied and reflexive, with 1144 
knappers responding to changing affordances rather than imposing invariant forms (Malafouris 1145 
2013), but the production of handaxes – and especially cleavers – unfolds from decisions made 1146 
early in the reduction process linked to raw material properties and to an intended end-form 1147 
(Gowlett 2006; Herzlinger et al. 2017);  1148 
4) The extended life histories of large Acheulean tools are the product of cooperative societies in 1149 
which technology is entangled with daily lives as conduits and creators of meaning 1150 
(Pfaffenberger 2001; Goren-Inbar 2011; Hodder 2012).  The evidence for caching of handaxes 1151 
(Preysler et al. 2018) indicates the shared abstraction of future use (Hockett 1960; Gärdenfors 1152 
2004); 1153 
5) The standardised forms and cultural selection of production processes are recurrent 1154 
conventional constructs indicative of symbol-based language (Holloway 1969; Peirce 1998). The 1155 
forms may have held semiotic value to those who made, used and viewed them, but we cannot 1156 
know the culturally specific meanings of the signs, including interpretants, generated by these 1157 
objects.  The identification of recurrent ergonomic design features in handaxes and cleavers 1158 
(Gowlett 2006), however, provides a way of disentangling Peirce’s triad as applied to these 1159 
forms.  For objects, his theory of signs specifies a logical-causal relation between material form 1160 
54 
 
and the signalling of meaning as indexes (proximity, causation) and icons (resemblance), 1161 
whereas symbols are conventional constructions more dependent on cultural knowledge to 1162 
interpret (Wallis 2013:210). The process of making a handaxe involves responding to raw 1163 
material constraints (e.g., internal flaws) and changing opportunities (e.g., edge angles) during 1164 
the production process (Mahaney 2014; Shipton 2018).  Adjustments are made in response to 1165 
these indexes in relation to an implicit awareness of the design imperatives (Wynn and Gowlett 1166 
2018).  The form of the tool signals immediate or future actions and as such is an icon, and this 1167 
association can extend to components used in the knapping process, such as hammers and cores.  1168 
An element of cultural knowledge exists in indexes and icons, but symbols are essentially 1169 
arbitrary constructs of meaning though ultimately linked to the material object. 1170 
 1171 
The superstructure of our argument, building on Peirce, is uniformitarian in design and content.  1172 
Cross-cultural observations drawn from pre-industrial societies demonstrate the centrality of 1173 
tools as media for generating and transmitting meaning and value. Tools have expressive 1174 
symbolic value beyond fulfilling particular functions, and in the case of handaxes and cleavers 1175 
they may have had multiple uses (McCall 2016: Chapter 3).  The ability to agree value is 1176 
distinctly cultural, and we make the wider point that symbols do not have to be reserved for ritual 1177 
or other rarefied activities.  Peirce makes no assumptions about the association of symbols with 1178 
specific behaviours, and nor do we.  Objects made to arbitrary repeated forms, such as a butter 1179 
knife, are the products of symbolic thought.  We assume that this was also the case in the past 1180 
with handaxes and cleavers.  We also argue that the development of labels (words as symbols) 1181 
for the repeated forms of the handaxe, cleaver and perhaps the pick, was the most efficient way 1182 
of referring to these objects where proximity was not possible (pointing as an index), and 1183 
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gestural images (icons) were too ambiguous to convey intention clearly (Donald 1991).  Clarity 1184 
of intention is also relevant in making the case for the efficacy of words in teaching to make 1185 
complex tools (Morgan et al. 2015; Gärdenfors and Högberg 2017; Herzlinger et al. 2017; 1186 
Laland 207; Lew-Levy et al. 2017).   1187 
 1188 
Our typology of grammars contributes to the growing gradualist approach to language evolution 1189 
by highlighting the capacity of simple word order to convey meaning without the need for 1190 
complex grammar (Hurford 2004; Piantadosi and Fedorenko 2017). Cross-cultural evidence for 1191 
the correlation of group size with grammatical complexity (Lupyan and Dale 2010; Dale and 1192 
Lupyan 2012) adds support to the contention that that Homo erectus, with a language based on 1193 
words as symbols with minimal grammar (a G1 language) could have created complex tools, 1194 
including boats, and planned for the future by provisioning landscapes and reaching distant 1195 
islands in Southeast Asia. We are not the first to attribute the capacity for symbols and language 1196 
to H. erectus (e.g., Deacon 1997; Tobias 2005; Gowlett 2009), but our claim is based on a 1197 
semiotic framework linked explicitly to technology and a distinct typology of syntax (G1-G3 1198 
grammars) as sufficient to underwrite language. 1199 
 1200 
Human tool-making is an order of complexity greater than that of any other animal, and that is in 1201 
part because language has integrated technology into all aspects of our social lives (Arthur 1202 
2009).  Learned traditions of tool use and making exist in non-human primates, often focused on 1203 
immediate needs with minimal attention to the form of tools (Goodall 1986), but chimpanzees 1204 
show a nascent capacity to categorise tool function (Grüber et al. 2015) which suggests that the 1205 
ability to partition causality existed in our last common ancestor.  There are hints too of 1206 
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vocalisations that are referential and learned, which if supported by observations in the wild 1207 
would add to the behavioural flexibility of that common ancestor, and to case for a gradual and 1208 
early evolution of language.   1209 
 1210 
The archaeological record suggests an early awareness of icons based on intentional use of 1211 
resemblance, and by two million years ago hominins had developed a reliance on technology and 1212 
a range of cooperative behaviours that exceeded those seen in other primates today (Plummer 1213 
and Bishop 2016).  With the emergence of the Acheulean tradition 1.7 million years ago the first 1214 
evidence exists of attention given to the visual form of artefacts, in this case a large symmetrical 1215 
handaxe from Olduvai Gorge that prefigures the standardisation of handaxe form later in the 1216 
Acheulean after 1.2 million years ago (Diez-Martína et al. 2019). The establishment of 1217 
conventions of handaxe and cleaver forms, and multiple ways of making these tools (Sharon 1218 
2009) marks the development of symbols and language. 1219 
 1220 
The capacity to share abstract concepts using language was a key transition in the evolution of 1221 
communication and in hominin evolution.  By extending that capacity to H. erectus we are not 1222 
denying the achievements of Homo sapiens, we are simply placing them in a broader 1223 
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Figure captions 2348 
Figure 1. a-c. Three diagrams illustrating the linear sentence structures enabled by G1 languages. 2349 
Figure 2.   An example of the hierarchical nesting of sub-phrases in a G2 language. 2350 
Figure 3. Diagram of the embedded structure of a G3 language with recursion. 2351 
Figure 4. Late Acheulean large tools: a) Handaxe (silcrete), Victoria Falls, Zambia; b)  2352 
Cleaver (quartzite), Kalambo Falls, Zambia; c) Pick (quartzite), Kalambo Falls, Zambia.  2353 
(Images copyright Chris Scott) 2354 
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Figure 5. Handaxe and cleaver ‘design imperatives’ (modified and redrawn after J.A.J. Gowlett 2355 
2006, Figure 2, with the author’s permission). The “glob-butt” is the centre of the mass, 2356 
typically at the butt end; “forward extension” provides leverage and is balanced by the 2357 
weight of the butt-mass; “support for the working edge” in the extension provides a 2358 
buttress for working edges in relation to the butt, and this applies to cleavers as well as 2359 
handaxes; “lateral extension” offers resistance to twisting during use, especially for long 2360 
working edges; “thickness adjustment” addresses the need for adjusting the thickness of 2361 
the mass and controlling edge angle. 2362 
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